Questions for the CEO of Civil Corp.

An oft-cited Republican mantra promotes the idea that the United States government should be more “businesslike” in its approach to governance. That is, it should not borrow excessively, it should manage its affairs with efficiency, it should not engage in Quixotic pursuits unrelated to the success of the company, etc. This is all in keeping with the conventional wisdom that businesses–and by extension, nations–survive because they are “fit” (AKA Social Darwinism). And it under-girds that famous, non-ideological axiom (so dear to the hearts of capitalists), that “The business of America is business.”

Let’s imagine, then, in light of such a premise, a list of questions that the Board of our company (that’s you and me) might have for the CEO (that’s you-know-who) as he petitions for continuance of his position as leader of the corporation.

Questions from the Chairman of the Board of Directors to the sitting CEO of Civil Corp:

  1. OK, it looks like we started off in Fiscal ’02 with a surplus of a couple of hundred billion. Now, according to these numbers from Lou in accounting, we’re looking at a debt load of about seven trillion bucks. I know we’ve hit a few bumps in the road, but Lou tells me your budgets are running half a trillion in the red for the next ten years or so, and it’s got him and the whole accounting staff pretty worried. How are we going to stay afloat with numbers like that? What are you doing to boost revenues and profits and reduce outlays?
  2. On acquisitions – it says here in your ’01 corporate goals report that you planned to scale back acquisitions. Even so, we went ahead and backed your hunch on Ira Co. and green-lighted the hostile takeover. Now we’re about 200 billion down here, with nothing to show for it and no prospects apart from more fiscal hemorrhaging and loss of key personnel through…um…attrition. That’s not to mention the PR beating we’re taking in the industry at large. Now I’m all for expansion, but it looks like your team never really had a post-acquisition plan in place. Did you honestly think the Ira Co. loyalists were going to bend over backward to help Civil Corp. restructure the company? I think it would have been prudent to expect at least a little foot dragging. The shareholders might have reacted differently to your proposition with more information on alternative outcomes. You know as well as I do the law of unintended consequences. Anyway, I want a full report on your plan for Ira Co. in fiscal ’05 by early October. We need a serious plan, and we need it now.
  3. HR is reporting that hiring is way down. It looks like we issued huge bonuses in both ’03 and ’04 to your top people, but bonuses down the line toward middle management and labor are flat. That doesn’t bother me, but since Accounting can’t justify any more revenue for payroll while we continue to hand out these bonuses, we’re understaffed. What’s your plan to help turn that around?
  4. We know the competition hit us pretty hard in ’01 right after you came on, and we don’t blame you for that. It was a rough year for the whole industry. You got right on the stick, and we’re grateful. But getting back to Ira Co. – it says here in your business plan that the takeover was part of a plan of targeted acquisition of competitive rivals in order to consolidate our market share and protect the company. But the boys in research were apparently wrong, or else you misunderstood them–Ira Co. isn’t even in the same markets as we are. Obviously, we didn’t “know” Ira Co. was gunning for us, because we now know they didn’t have the manufacturing capacity to do so. And what’s more, All Chaos, our biggest competitor, is still out there punching away at us and intimidating our business partners. And Tali Brands – are we sure they’re out of the picture? I’ve heard rumors. The shareholders will want to know–why did we reduce efforts addressing a known threat in order to go after a paper tiger
  5. I’ve got a report here from the facilities manager that says our utility bills are soaring, and they’re climbing every year. He says we could put a real dent in these bills just by encouraging our building managers to make a few changes–turn off the lights, turn down the thermostats, reducing fleet vehicle size, that kind of thing. Now you know I’m not one of those touchy-feely environmental types, but business is business, and we have an opportunity to increase efficiencies here. I think we just need to lead the way, and the staff will see the value in it for the good of the company. Still, your executive VP–is it Dick?–issued a memo last year that actually discourages staff from reducing our utility bills. He seems to think there’s no need to conserve at all. I think I speak for most of the board when I say we need to conserve everywhere we can. It just makes good fiscal sense. (And by the way, I’ve heard rumors that the utilities are heavily invested in All Chaos. You look at it that way, and we’re helping All Chaos succeed with every extra dollar we spend on energy.) Will you look into what’s behind Dick’s apparent abandonment of environmental efficiencies as a company policy?

Safety and Politics

It’s tax time in America. The time when we fork over our dough to the elite ruling class, so that they may distribute it among themselves – the corporate welfare, the pork projects, the subsidies and the arms deals that make this country great. Never mind that the bridges and schools are falling apart, or that the parks and libraries are closing due to lack of funds. Those limos don’t pay for themselves!

But that’s all the ranting I’ll do about it. In principle, I don’t mind paying taxes at all. But when we have to pay more and more for less and less visible results, it gets frustrating.

What’s really on my mind is a kind of “Eureka” moment I had the other day. My wife asked, rhetorically, why it is that we can’t even determine whether — forget about “why” or “how”  — anyone in the government screwed up in failing to protect the country from the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Although I had been following the 9/11 hearings, I hadn’t been dwelling on that angle. But she was right. No matter what happens, you can be sure that no one of any consequence will be “blamed” or held accountable for what did or didn’t happen in the weeks and months prior to the event. And because no one will be blamed, no “fault” will exist.

Instead, the blame will go to “policies” and “structures” that did not allow the otherwise competent folks in the government to get the job done. They would have, the story will go, but their hands were tied by the restrictive operational rules of their respective agencies. The solution? My guess will be a long-term, costly “revamping” of this or that agency, with no accountability down the line to see if it actually did any good. Memos will be written, departments will be restructured, policies will be retooled — and none of us will be any safer than we are now.

So my answer to her was, “Because there is no one left in this country’s government who can look at anything from a point of view that is not shaped by politics.” In other words, even though the 9/11 hearings are seemingly meant to address the gravest, most serious threat to America’s future since World War II and help the nation overcome that threat, no one participating in them sees them that way. They truly do not. They do understand that is the contextof the hearings (or, for the more cynical among them, the pretext). But they are also acutely aware that the important stakes for these hearings are political, and will be won or lost on November 2nd.

The next general election–rather than the next terror attack–is what drives the majority of participants’ responses, their analysis, their very thought processes in preparing to testify or question those who testify.

It’s unfortunate, but I believe we are at such a point. We have reached a state of politicization and polarization that does not allow for any situation, however much it may endanger the populace, to override the single guiding principle of all activity in Washington today — which is to preserve power (for those who hold it) or to gain power (for those who do not).

What this means in the context of testimony and questioning at the hearings is equally straightforward: no testimony means anything, because its meaning is interpreted by virtue of which side you’re on. It’s akin to Orwell’s true definition of doublespeak: you say one thing, believe an entirely opposite thing, and yet can embrace both concepts as inherently “true” because one is “objective” truth (for example, that the war against Iraq was a war of choice) and one is “political” truth (the war against Iraq was a war of necessity).  Take Condaleeza Rice. The pundits have been batting her testimony around for weeks, and if you read the analysis you come up with two perfectly opposing versions of what she said.

If you’re anti-Bush: Rice spun the facts and misrepresented the nature of pre-attack warnings from intelligence agencies to cover for Bush’s and her own inability to effect top-down control over security agencies in the face of clear warnings and evidence of impending attacks.

If you’re pro-Bush: Rice acquitted herself and the administration admirably, providing a solid basis for her assertion that there was no “actionable” intelligence for the administration to act on and that no one could have predicted the time, place and scale of attacks prior to the event based on the intelligence at hand.

Can both versions be correct? Probably not, but each are effectively “true” for the equal halves of the country that believe each version. Does the truth inhabit some “middle ground” between the two partisan interpretations? Possibly, but not necessarily–the moderate answer is not more true by virtue of its being  non-partisan. It may simply be a wishy-washy interpretation of baldly partisan rhetoric.

And the result? Paralysis. Since it cannot be determined which version is “empirically correct” without access to an independent evaluation of the evidence (as opposed to the conclusions of a “bipartisan” committee, which can be painted as political by those who don’t like them), the result for politically dispassionate observers is a kind of circular syllogism of cause and effect:

If A is true, it follows that B is true
A may or may not be true
therefore,
B may or may not be true

To put it in the context of 9/11:

If our leaders were warned of impending attacks, they should have done something to prevent them.
Our leaders may or may not have been warned of impending attacks;
therefore,
they should or should not have done something to prevent them.

And so on, forever. So we might as well get used to the terror attacks–while it may be theoretically possible to prevent them, it’s become politically impossible to figure out whose job it is.